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1 “The twentieth century’s dramatic drop in economic inequality was entirely due to falls in 
inequality in income from capital” (Piketty 2014, p. 366).
Where Is the Middle Class?  
Evidence from 60 Million English  
Death and Probate Records, 1892–1992
Neil CummiNs
This article analyzes a newly constructed individual level dataset of every English 
death and probate from 1892–1992. This analysis shows that the twentieth 
century’s “Great Equalization” of wealth stalled in mid-century. The probate rate, 
which captures the proportion of English holding any significant wealth at death 
rose from 10 percent in the 1890s to 40 percent by 1950 and has stagnated to 1992. 
Despite the large declines in the wealth share of the top 1 percent, from 73 to 20 
percent, the median English individual died with almost nothing throughout. All 
changes in inequality after 1950 involve a reshuffling of wealth within the top 30 
percent. I translate the individual level data to synthetic households; the majority 
have at least one member probated. Yet the bottom 60 percent of households 
hold only 12 percent of all wealth, at their peak wealth-holding level, in the early 
1990s. I also compare the new wealth data with existing estimates of top wealth 
shares, home-ownership trends, wealth survey distributions, aggregate wealth, 
and the wealth Gini coefficient.
The distribution of the gains from capitalism, globalization, and tech-nological progress preoccupies academic and popular economics 
(Ricardo 1821; Marx 1867; Piketty 2014). Within countries, the driving 
force behind the twentieth century’s drop in inequality were the declines 
in the wealth shares of the top 1 percent (Alvaredo, Atkinson, and Morelli 
2018; Saez and Zucman 2016; Piketty 2014).1 From this, a “patrimonial 
(or propertied) middle class” arose (Piketty 2014, p. 260).
This article shows that for the ownership of capital in Britain, it was not 
the rise of a broad “middle” class that characterized the twentieth century 
wealth distribution but a reshuffling of wealth away from the top 1 percent 
to the rest of the top 20–30 percent. The majority die with nothing.
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I introduce and analyze a new individual level dataset of every English 
adult death and probate (60m and 18m, respectively) from 1892–1992, a 
period which captures the secular decline of wealth inequality in Britain. 
The top 1 percent share declines from 73 to 20 percent. Despite this 
“Great Equalization,” the relative gains from the decline of the elite are 
limited to the top 30 percent after 1950. The median English person dies 
with no significant wealth, throughout the entire period. Inferring via 
Pareto power law extrapolations that the decline of the 1 percent led to a 
rise in median wealth is mistaken.
This article utilizes a unique resource for understanding English wealth 
holding—the annual calendars of the Principal Probate Registry (PPR). 
This resource has comprehensive, population-wide coverage of the estate 
values of those dying with wealth above a threshold level (£10 in 1900, 
£5,000 in 1992). While the wealth estimates are imperfect, as detailed in 
the first section, it is our single best source for the evolution of English 
wealth holding over the twentieth century. While samples have been used 
in previous research, the complete database has never been analyzed. 
This is due to the scale of the task of digitizing the millions of individual 
records. Modern computing technology now makes the analysis possible. 
I document the principles behind the mass digitization of archival records 
and their conversion to structured data.
The article uses the PPR Calendars to track quantitatively the wealth 
of the English 1892–1992, and tracks the rise of a new wealth “middle 
class.”
What Is the “Middle Class?”
There is no single, widely accepted definition of “middle class.”2 There 
are a universe of competing and contradictory definitions, invoking 
elements of occupation, social networks, cultural taste, the keeping of 
servants, and even fashion, accent, and word choice. In the tradition of 
Weber, contemporary sociology interprets “class” as a multidimensional 
construct.3 Many economists’ definition of the middle class are typically 
based on absolute quantitative thresholds of income, expenditure, or 
2 Adam Smith wrote of the “superior” rank (the rich and the aristocracy), contrasted with the 
middling and inferior ranks of society (Smith 1776). Marx (1867) defined two classes based 
on the ownership of capital, the proletariat and the Bourgeoisie. Weber (1947) had a broader 
conceptualization of class, including social status and political power.
3 Recently, Savage et al. (2013) have employed a multidimensional latent classification of 
economic, social, and cultural capital. They estimate that 31 percent of Britons in 2012 are 
represented by the “middle class.” However, adding in their “New Affluent workers” who are 
defined as having “moderately good economic capital,” the economic middle class of Britain is 
thought to be around 46 percent (Savage et al. 2013, p. 230, table 5).
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wealth.4 An alternative to this is to take a relative approach: for example, 
Piketty defines his “patrimonial middle class” as the 50th–90th percen-
tile (2014, pp. 347–8). Wolff, who has characterized the evolution of 
“middle class” wealth in the United States defines the “middle class” as 
the middle three quintiles of the wealth distribution (2017, p. 6).
Among economic and social historians, there are also no consistent 
demarcation of the concept of “middle class.” It is often left undefined, 
based on occupational title or an income or wealth threshold.5 However, 
in the historiography, it is clear that many scholars envisage the middle 
class as not being a middle of society categorization but rather an interme-
diate, newly ascendant class, in between the landed gentry and aristocracy, 
and the laboring population. In this conceptualization, the “middle class” 
could entirely be located within the top 10 percent of the population.6
This analysis requires a definition of the wealth “middle class” that 
is valid for the entire sample period, from the time of Queen Victoria to 
Brexit. Thus, the definition I employ here is simple. I define the wealth 
“middle class” as the even middle of the wealth distribution, the middle 
33 percent, containing the median English decedent. This definition 
4 See, for example, Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2001), Banerjee and Duflo (2008), and Kharas 
(2010) who use income thresholds to define a middle class. For more discussion on economists’ 
conceptualization of “middle class” see Atkinson and Brandolini (2011) and López-Calva and 
Ortiz-Juarez (2014).
5 For example, works explicitly invoking the concept of “middle class” but who choose 
not to define, or cite a definition, for what “middle class” precisely refers to are Lindert and 
Williamson (1983), Landes (1998), Boot (1999), and Stone (1978). The implication is usually 
that being “middle class” is defined by occupation, but this is not always made explicit (see, 
e.g., Landes (1998, p. 221) and Stone (1978, pp. 192–200) for references to a “middle class” 
that is not defined). Boot (1999) states that the “term middle class is contentious” but does not 
offer his own definition. Musgrove (1959) employs income thresholds and occupational titles. 
Lindert (1986) defines “middle class occupations” as “shopkeepers, craftsmen, and the middle 
agricultural classes (farmers, yeomen, and husbandmen)” (p. 1138). For a critical history of the 
term see Wahrman (1995) and Gunn (2004). A nuanced discussion of “middle class” wealth in 
late nineteenth-century Britain is given in Green and Owens (2013).
6 Rubinstein summarizes this neatly: “our common perception of British history during the 
nineteenth century rests upon several tacit assumptions which remain untested and which may 
or may not be correct. The chief among these are that the wealthiest men of nineteenth-century 
England, apart from the great landowners, were engaged in industry and manufacturing, in trades 
which were a direct part of the Industrial Revolution; that the nineteenth-century middle class 
consisted primarily of industrialists and manufacturers; and that the new towns of the north of 
England brought into existence a group of middle-class industrialists sufficient in wealth and 
numbers to constitute the dominant element in Victorian society” (Rubinstein 1977a, p. 602). 
The implication here is that the “middle class” are the richest non-landholding English. Under 
the occupational definition of Musgrove (1959), the “middle class” number 2.9 million in 1911 
(p. 104, table 1), around 10–20 percent of the working male population. Under THC Stevenson’s 
official and hugely influential Occupational schema of 1911, Stevenson (1920), the “Upper 
and Middle class” are placed together in Class I (of eight). This “middle class” elite plays a 
central role in many economic models of the Industrial Revolution. For example, via pressuring 
for institutional change (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005) or via their work ethic and 
behavior (Clark 2007; Doepke and Zilibotti 2008).
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can speak to both a relative interpretation of what “middle class” is and 
an absolute: I estimate the percentile shares of the wealth distribution 
below the top 10 percent and evaluate that change over time (Figure 6). 
However, I also report the proportion of any English with any significant 
wealth (Figure 4 Panel (b)). This simple measure captures the median 
English decedent and gives us a sense of the absolute position of the 
middle of the distribution. It should be stressed that this “middle class” 
definition is very different from that of historians of early-modern and 
nineteenth-century Britain. These definitional debates aside, one feature 
unique to the individual level data is the ability to redefine the measures 
used here into whatever percentile threshold one desires.
The Level of Analysis
The PPR Calendars utilized here report individual wealth holding. An 
alternative unit of analysis is the household, which is often employed in 
wealth surveys (such as the modern Wealth and Assets Survey Office for 
National Statistics (2018b)).
Which level is preferable? The household level is perhaps best suited 
for understanding the underlying distribution of consumption and invest-
ment that is related to wealth. The individual level is better suited for 
understanding the underlying political economy of wealth holding, both 
between and within households.
In order to consolidate these two levels, I propose in the fourth section 
a simple adjustment to the individual level data that generates estimates 
of household level wealth. I assume that each individual observation 
represents a household of two people. It is a crude calculation and must 
be interpreted carefully. Yet it helps us understand how the individual 
data connects to the household level. As it is always essential to triangu-
late data with available sources, we can then examine whether the PPR 
Calendar data is consistent with existing household level data. This is 
done in the fifth section, which compares the PPR Calendar data with 
existing estimates of top wealth shares, home-ownership trends, wealth 
survey distributions, aggregate wealth, and the wealth Gini coefficient.
Tracking the “Middle Class,” 1892–1992
This article follows existing empirical work on the historical English 
wealth distribution by Lindert (1986), Atkinson and Harrison (1978), 
Atkinson, Gordon, and Harrison (1989), and Atkinson (2013). It comple-
ments recent work, using a different but related source, by Alvaredo, 
Cummins362
Atkinson, and Morelli (2018) for wealth, and by Scott and Walker (2020) 
for top incomes. The individual level data developed here allows for 
broader claims about the wealth distribution outside the top 10 percent.
There are three principal contributions of this article. First, I detail the 
construction of the probate and wealth database. The process involved 
the transformation of more than 1.5 million scanned images into a set 
of text files. Next the text was algorithmically parsed and formed into 
a database suitable for economic analysis. This largely automated data-
building methodology has the potential to be applied to many other 
scanned historical sources. Any historical document with a standard 
structure can be converted in this way.
Second, I contribute new estimates of the top wealth shares. They 
closely match recent estimates from separate sources, validating the 
constructed data. For the first time wealth shares beyond the top 20 
percent are estimated.7
Third, I combine the probate data with all English deaths, 1892–2018, 
to calculate the probate rate. By analyzing the probate rate and the changes 
in the wealth shares of the top 30 percent, I am able to characterize the 
relative “winners” from the twentieth century’s “great equalization” of 
wealth. The “winners” are not a broad “middle class.” The distributional 
gains are exclusively confined to the top 30 percent of the wealth distri-
bution. This stark finding has been missed by previous studies of the 
English wealth distribution who were restricted by the available data 
to estimating top wealth shares. For example, Alvaredo, Atkinson, and 
Morelli (2018) say nothing on the distribution of wealth beneath the top 
10 percent (see their figure 7, p. 34).8
Using the individual PPR Calendar data, I also calculate the implied 
household level estimates of wealth inequality. As many modern wealth 
surveys are executed at this level, it is important to do this to triangulate 
the results with existing estimates. The PPR individual level results are 
consistent with most households having at least one wealth holder who 
is probated. Yet, even at this level, the bottom 60 percent of households 
7 Estimates for the top 20 percent wealth share are presented by Atkinson, Gordon, and Harrison 
(1989, p. 318, table 1).
8 This finding is consistent with Atkinson, Gordon, and Harrison (1989). Using estate data 
from 1923–1981, “..almost no improvement in the share of the bottom 80% is evident” (p. 320). 
Further evidence for the stagnating probate rate is reflected in the Online Appendix of Alvaredo, 
Atkinson, and Morelli (2018) (Figures C1: Adult decedents covered by the estate statistics in 
the UK 1895–2015). Here the proportion of adult deaths dying below the estate-tax threshold is 
reported, from 1895 to 2015 and above the probate threshold from 1960–2015. As the probate 
threshold is significantly lower than the estate-tax threshold throughout, my series has the power 
to make positive claims on the wealth shares outside the top 10 percent and the median wealth 
level of English decedents, 1892–2018.
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hold only 12 percent of all wealth, at their peak wealth-holding level, in 
the early 1990s.
The PPR Calendar data used in this article is consistent with existing 
estimates of top wealth shares, home-ownership trends across the twen-
tieth century, wealth surveys from the 1950s on, aggregate wealth esti-
mates for the economy, and the wealth Gini coefficient from the 1970s.
This article consists of seven sections. The first section discusses the 
source for the probate data, the PPR Calendars, 1892–1992. The second 
section describes the many stages behind the data construction. The third 
section presents new estimates for the evolution of wealth inequality at 
the individual level in England, 1892–1992, and the fourth section pres-
ents an alternative synthetic household level analysis of inequality. The 
fifth section triangulates the results with existing estimates and the sixth 
section discusses the implications and interpretation of these results. The 
seventh section provides conclusions.
THE SOURCE
The Principal Probate Registry Calendars
The data for analysis is a complete digitization of the PPR Calendar for 
England and Wales from 1892–1992. In order for a will to be executed 
and assets transferred, an act of probate must be granted. The probate 
index records all those who died with wealth above a minimum threshold 
(see Table 1).
Together with the name, address, and date of death of the deceased 
were details of the executor of the estate and an estimate of the estate 
value. Not everyone who dies has assets. Therefore the probate data is 
supplemented with complete death registers, 1838–2006. The centralized, 
national, printed Calendars begin in 1858 and extend (in microfiche form 
after 1979) until 1996—the index is now in digital form. The data was 
only extracted between 1892 and 1992 as the format of entries is consis-
tent during this interval. (In 1993 the format of the entries was changed to 
all capital letters; this made the relative extraction of individual informa-
tion, as described in the second section, impossible after 1992.)
Table 2 summarizes the type of assets included in the probate valua-
tions. The values in the index are “gross”—where the net value accounts 
for debts and funeral expenses.9 The biggest consistent omission is 
9 The difference between the gross and net, where both are available is typically 5–15 percent 
(Rubinstein 1974). Where the initial valuation is subsequently revised (“resworn”), I take that 
new estimate as the observed wealth. I assume that executors would do this where their debts 
substantially changed the value of an estate. Under this assumption, we can be reasonably 
confident that debts do not matter for the analysis and conclusions here.
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“settled personalty”—for example, trust funds (Rubinstein 1974, p. 70). 
Also, there is no information on inter-vivos gifts.10 It is also worth noting 
that transfers to spouses or charity were never subject to inheritance tax, 
reducing the incentive to mis-report estates (Alvaredo, Atkinson, and 
Morelli 2018, p. 39). As noted by Rubinstein:
Although imperfect in several respects the probate valuations offer comprehensive 
and objective information on the personal wealth of the entire British population 
in the modern period. They are, moreover, probably unique among advanced 
industrial nations in presenting probate valuations for the whole population... 
It is a mystery why so little use has been made of them (1977b, p. 100–1, my 
emphasis).
It is important to note that existing work on the distribution of wealth in 
England and Wales, such as Atkinson and Harrison (1978), Atkinson, 
Gordon, and Harrison (1989), Atkinson (2013), and Alvaredo, Atkinson, 
and Morelli (2018) use a different data source; aggregated summary data 
from the Inland Revenue. There, estates are aggregated into sizes and 
types, and published in tabulations in the Annual Reports of the Inland 
Revenue.11 The key difference between the PPR Calendar valuations and 
the Inland Revenue data is that the latter are anonymous and grouped (and 
Table 1




1858–1900 £10 Turner (2010, p. 628)
1901–1931 £50 Turner (2010, p. 628)
1932–1964 £100 Atkinson and Harrison (1978, p. 36)
1965–1974 £500 Atkinson and Harrison (1978, p. 36)
1975–1984 £1,500 Atkinson and Harrison (1978, p. 36)
1984→ £5,000 Turner (2010, p. 628), Alvaredo, Atkinson, and 
Morelli (2018, p. 29)
Atkinson, Atkinson, and Morelli (2017, p. F8), 
Karagiannaki (2015, p. 187)
Source: Author’s compilation.
10 Wealth in trusts has been estimated at <1 percent of all wealth (Alvaredo, Atkinson, and 
Morelli 2018, p. 40). See, also, the same article for a discussion of the importance of inter-vivos 
gifts (p. 39). Karagiannaki (2011), using the British Household Panel Survey, estimates inter-
vivos transfers at 2.3 percent of total wealth for 2004.
11 Alvaredo, Atkinson, and Morelli (2018) list their exact data sources by year in their Online 
Appendix pages 3–4. They use the Annual Report of the Inland Revenue, 1895–1968, the Inland 
Revenue Statistics Division 1968–97, and the National Archive and HMRC 1997–2013.
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will be closed to the public for the next 150 years), while the former are 
not (Rubinstein 1974, 1981; Harbury 1962; Harbury and Hitchens 1979). 
This allows the direct individual, family, and surname analysis of wealth 
in England. The Inland Revenue estate valuations are also different from 
the probate valuations: they include the property that is excluded from 
the Calendar valuations (Table 2) (Rubinstein 1974, p. 70).12
Previous work directly using the individual probate valuations includes 
Wedgwood (1928), Harbury (1962), Perkin (1978), Rubinstein (1977a, 
1977b, 1981), Nicholas (1999), Rothery (2007), Turner (2010), and Clark 
and Cummins (2015a, 2015b). All of these articles are based on rela-
tively small samples. This article presents estimates from the universe of 
English probates, 1892–2018.
Only estates at death above a specified minimum value required an 
act of probate to transfer the assets. Estates below the threshold were 
known as “small estates.” Table 1 reports the changing definition of a 
“small estate” from 1858–2020.13 The treatment of non-probated wealth 
is described in the next section. In Online Appendix Section C, I examine 
whether these changes in the probate threshold result in structural breaks 
in wealth inequality. There are no systematic deviations from trend across 
the years when the definition changed.
12 See also Alvaredo, Atkinson, and Morelli (2018, p. 43): “Probate values tend to understate 
the HMRC/IR figures as they are only intended to cover all those assets which an executor must 
dispose of in accordance with the testator’s will (or the intestacy rules).” They compare the 
Probate valuations of 74 deceased members of the Sunday Times Rich list with their Rich List 
estimated wealth. They find “.. for the largest estates in probates (above £200 million at 2015 
prices) the List considerably underestimates wealth.”
13 Atkinson and Harrison (1978, p. 36) state that “prior to 1965 the limit was £100” and Turner 
(2010, p. 628) states that the limit “ranged from £50 to £500.” However it was possible to deduce 
the minimum value from the probate records themselves—there was significant clumping at the 
minimum value threshold and by tabulating the five most frequently recorded probate values by 
year of probate and manually checking the resulting output, it was possible to work out what the 
limit was between 1932 and 1964.
Table 2
THE PROBATE VALUATIONS
Years                 Valuation
1858–1898 Unsettled Personalty + Let Freeholds
1898–1925 ” + Unsettled realty
1925→ ” + Settled Land
Notes: Based on information from Rubinstein (1974, 1977b) and Turner (2010). “Unsettled” 
refers to cash from the sale of an asset where as “settled” refers to assets that are unsold but held 
in trust for successive beneficiaries (see https://www.gov.uk/guidance/inheritance-tax-manual/
section-8-settled-property for more details on the legal definitions).
Source: Author’s compilation.
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Unfortunately, the probate valuations do contain significant flaws as 
measures of wealth. Non-transferable wealth such as defined-benefit 
pension entitlements and annuities that end with death are completely 
omitted (Harbury 1962, p. 849). Wealth held in joint bank accounts and 
housing held in joint ownership is also exempt from probate (GOV.UK 
2020b; Harbury 1962, p. 847).14 However, as death is inevitable, wealth 
will still be observed for the couple once. Despite these omissions, 
Alvaredo Atkinson, and Morelli (2017) report that “the ‘small estate’ 
category probably accounts for the large majority of estates that do not 
go through probate” (p. F9).
The probate valuations also exclude human capital, health capital, and 
rights to health-care, and other public services such as parks, clean air, 
and protection from crime, among many other elements.15 As Wedgwood 
(1928) states: “generally speaking, the probate valuations are restricted 
to property within the free disposition of the deceased ... at the time of his 
death” (p. 42). In other words, the probate valuations refer to controllable 
financial capital.16 Despite these considerable flaws, the PPR Calendar 
valuations remain the best and most consistent, systematically collected 
estimates of individual English wealth holding over the twentieth century.
Estimated Probated Wealth at Death and Its Relationship  
to Actual Wealth during Life
The PPR Calendar valuations record a portion of wealth at death (see 
Table 2). There are a number of conceptual problems extending the 
patterns and trends of the probated wealth of the dead to the total wealth 
of the living.
First the dead are not randomly sampled. Older people die in greater 
proportions than younger people. Therefore any claim about wealth 
inequality, for example, in 1980 based on probated wealth, really corre-
sponds to those dying in 1980, born on average in 1910 and experiencing 
their young life during WWI and WWII, having families in the 1940s and 
1950s, working and saving from the Great Depression to the Thatcher 
era. It does not tell us about the average experience of someone living in 
the 1980s. And, of course, death cohorts are mixtures of different birth 
14 However, the value of these assets are included in inheritance tax (GOV.UK 2020a; Harbury 
1962, p. 847).
15 For example, mental health, the quality and depth of social ties, spiritual health, and much 
more. Wealth is but one aspect that people value in life, and we can expect that individuals will 
trade off wealth for time doing activities that promote non-financial wealth.
16 See Alvaredo, Atkinson, and Morelli (2018, p. 28) on this point as it relates to the Inland 
Revenue series estimates.
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cohorts. There is also a potentially large life-course pattern to wealth 
accumulation. Failing to account for these potential effects may lead to 
a substantial difference between a person’s probated wealth and their 
actual wealth during their life.17 The traditional solution to these age-
composition issues is to re-weight the observed wealth-at-death to match 
the age distribution of the living. Mortality multipliers (the inverse of the 
death rate by age) can be applied if age is available, as done in Atkinson 
and Harrison (1978).
Unfortunately, age at death is not reported in the PPR Calendars. But 
as Alvaredo, Atkinson, and Morelli (2018) show emphatically in their 
figure 6 (p. 33), there is no substantive difference in the level or trend 
of the wealth shares by the application of mortality multipliers to the 
Inland Revenue estate data. No attempt is made here to re-weight the 
PPR wealth data.
The PPR data used here end in 1992. However, there has been no change 
in the relative shares from 1980–1985 to 2015 (see Alvaredo, Atkinson, 
and Morelli 2018, p. 29, figure 2). Whatever process has driven the huge 
shift in wealth shares over the past 100 years was complete in 1980.
BUILDING THE DATA
The Principal Probate Registry Calendar 1892–1992
The original printed volumes of the PPR Calendars, from 1858 to 
1996, have been digitized as scanned images and are made available at 
https://probatesearch.service.gov.uk (GOV.UK 2020) [last accessed 25 
April 2016]. (However, the resulting data I extracted ends in 1992, due 
to the change in format in 1993 that made relative text extraction based 
on patterns impossible.) The data are free for academics to utilize (see 
the Open Government License for public sector information). Examples 
of the webpage interface and resulting images of the original index are 
shown in Figure 1.
In order to create a database of the PPR Calendar suitable for academic 
use, I created a script to mass download all the image files (e.g., Figure 1). 
17 Another issue is status-based selection effects. In England, as everywhere, the rich die older 
than the poor. Further, this socio-economic gradient in a lifespan has changed over time (see, 
e.g., Office for National Statistics (2015a)). In addition, the average age at death of all English 
has changed over time, from about 58 in 1900 to 78 by 2000 (average age of death of those dying 
over 20 calculated from the death register data used here, plotted in Online Appendix Figure 
J.4). The PPR Calendar entries thus represent older individuals on average over time. However, 
the population itself is older too, so it is unclear what bias this causes. As the PPR Calendars 





1905&page=1#calendar. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government 
Licence v3.0.
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The search engine had the feature that all results for a two letter string 
code starting sequence were returned: for example, searching for “SM” 
in 1850 returned all those with “SM” as the first two letters of their last 
name probated in 1850. I searched https://probatesearch.service.gov.
uk for every two letter combination from “AA” to “ZZ” for every year 
from 1858 to 1996 inclusive, and recorded the number of result pages. 
This information allowed me to construct the base URLs that would 
lead me to each of the scanned images, for example, https://probates-
earch.service.gov.uk/Calendar?surname=Cummins&yearOfDeath= 
1905&page=1#calendar directs to the image in Figure 1. This led to 
the creation of 1,013,056 URLs that were used to download the index 
images. This process was automated.
Optical Character Recognition (OCR) was performed for each of 
the index pages using ABBYY fine-reader 12 software. This software 
performed by far the best in terms of fidelity and consistency (as compared 
to free software such as Google’s tesseract). Over one million images 
were collected into 504 PDF files of 2,000 pages each. This process was 
also automated.
The OCR process resulted in 504 “dirty” (unformatted, full of dupli-
cates) text files. These files were merged into 10 larger text files. Next the 
text patterns underlying the PPR Calendar entry structure were deduced 
by inspection (as indicated by the bolded text in Online Appendix Figure 
A.1). The patterns are reported in Table 3. These features were found, 
marked, and parsed using regular expression in the Perl computing 
language (executed as command line .bat files). Following this, a set of 








Delimits death date “died”
12 December 1946




Benjamin Kaye boot and shoemaker
Delimits taxable estate amount Effects
£1082 9s. Id.
Note: Many variations of the above were employed.
Source: PPR Calendars, 1892–1992.
Cummins370
The resulting “semi-clean” text files were imported to R and marked 
patterns in the text were found using SQL language (via the R package 
sqldf). The code converted the text to a database of rows and columns. 
Unique entries were identified and duplicates discarded. After this, indi-
vidual fields were constructed from the relative position patterns. Years 
and wealth were attributed. Much code was then devoted to cleaning the 
wealth measure as many entries had £ and shilling values conflated, and 
post 1970 many records had the effects value conflated with a 10-digit 
record number (resulting in many decedents with astronomical levels of 
wealth, for an for example see the last two entries in Online Appendix 
Figure A.1). This cleaning process was a combination of manual, by-eye, 
checking to discover patterns of problems and coding via SQL in R to 
clean the main data.
All nominal millionaires (over 4,000) were visually checked one by 
one, via www.ancestry.com and the probate service website.18 Some 
examples of problematic and unusually rich entries are reported in Online 
Appendix Figure A.2.
This process, summarized in Figure 2, resulted in a database of N = 15, 
152, 822, all with full name, street address, date of death, and wealth at 
death.
BANDED PROBATE VALUATIONS AFTER 1980
After 1980 there was a change in the system for valuing probates in 
the PPR Calendars. As opposed to an exact valuation, which was the 
practice 1892–1979, a proportion of valuations appear as banded esti-
mations. These are £25,000, £40,000, £70,000, £100,000, £115,000, and 
£125,000, with each entry listed as “Not Exceeding” the banded amount. 
Table 4 reports the overall incidence of the banded values, 1892–1992. 
It is clearly evident that these bands are loosely applied. The proportion 
of probated values that were entered as bands was about 60 percent in 
the 1980s and inspection of the data revealed that using these numbers 
for wealth distribution analysis was pointless. For example, Gini coef-
ficients calculated using the banded values suggest a sudden, dramatic 
and large drop in wealth inequality in precisely 1980. Outside of war, 
revolution, and natural disaster, we would not expect such huge drops 
18 This check was not automated as the images on the probate website and ancestry.co.uk, were 
not text data, but image files. Checking in this way allowed the author to have full confidence in 
the top tail of the wealth distribution and gave a sense of any systematic problems with the data-
building methodology. The code to transform the raw text to structured data could be tweaked. An 
example of the necessity of this was the conflation of serial numbers with probate valuations, as 
seen in the record for Elsie Bambridge, reported in Online Appendix Figure A.2.















Text Parsed PERL, R, Ultraedit
Checks
Duplication, Sanity, Eye-







in inequality on a year to year basis. Further, the values of wealth neces-
sary to enter the various top percentiles change dramatically after 1980. 
Occam’s Razor suggests that such a sudden change in the years immedi-
ately following a new valuation system is probably a direct result of that 
valuation system. Attributing a value based upon the average wealth of 
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observed specific values also led to implausible drops in measured wealth 
inequality during the “banded” years. It was also clear by visually exam-
ining the entries, the “banded” entries did not transmit much information 
about the true wealth of the decedents. Therefore all banded values were 
dropped entirely and the post 1980 analysis relies on the distribution of 
specific, non-banded probated values only. (The “excluded” population 
post 1980 had to be adjusted by the proportion of those probated who 
have a banded value).
The critical assumption is that the distribution of specific probate esti-
mates represent the population distribution of wealth above the probate 
threshold. This is probably incorrect. Using specific values instead of 
the bands is likely to oversample the rich—who can pay to have their 
deceased family member’s estate professionally valued. Caution must be 
therefore exercised when interpreting the post 1980 trends. The direc-
tion of the bias however can be gauged by considering who has been 
selectively purged from the data by dropping the wealth banded valu-
ations. The rich are more represented as previously noted—the poor 
are still represented, but we are taking people out of the upper middle 
of the distribution—which other things being equal is likely to bias the 
inequality estimates upward. As the finding is of flat/declining inequality 
post 1980, I argue that the expected direction of the bias does not contra-
dict this analysis’ post 1980 results.
Table 4
PROPORTION OF ALL DECEDENTS AND THOSE PROBATED  















Source: PPR Calendars, 1892–1992.
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CALCULATING THE COMPONENTS OF THE  
WEALTH DISTRIBUTION
Combining Probates and Deaths, Inferring Wealth
To understand the evolution of wealth inequality at death in England 
and Wales, it was necessary to combine the probate data with the complete 
death registers, also collected for this project. This process is described 
in the Online Appendix Sections G and H. Table 5 reports the number of 
probates and deaths over 20 by decade from 1892 to 1992. The propor-
tion of adults receiving probate after death rises from 15 percent in the 
1890s to 40 percent by 1992.
As Alvaredo, Atkinson, and Morelli (2017, p. F9), I treat these non-
probated estates as reporting “insignificant” wealth. For the analysis of 
overall wealth inequality, the wealth of these omitted decedents has to be 
inferred. Following the standard method of the Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs (HMRC), I assigned each non-probated adult a wealth equal 
to half the level of wealth observed in the probate Calendars for the year 
of death that was below the threshold (Turner 2010, pp. 628–9).19 Figure 
3 reports the total value of real wealth, 1892–1992 for the probated popu-
lation and the inferred excluded population. Despite the fact that the 
probated population is a minority, only 15–49 percent of the total death 
population in any year, the application of an inferred minimum wealth to 
Table 5
COUNTS OF PROBATES AND ADULT DEATHS, 1892–1992
Period N Probates N Deaths > 20 Probate Rate
1892–1900 376,292 2,498,315 .15
1900s 624,951 3,558,901 .18
1910s 588,213 3,591,196 .16
1920s 811,868 3,696,695 .22
1930s 1,196,711 4,222,475 .28
1940s 1,715,975 4,627,277 .37
1950s 2,034,470 4,980,193 .41
1960s 2,292,231 5,376,468 .43
1970s 2,324,704 5,676,328 .41
1980–1992 2,929,142 7,330,740 .40
1892–1992 14,894,557 45,558,588 .33
Source: PPR Calendars, 1892–1992 and complete death registers 1892–1992. 
19 Many estates were valued below the threshold level in the Probate Calendar.
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the remainder implies that on average 98 percent of all wealth is being 
captured by those probated. (Changes in wealth inequality over time can 
thus be captured by accounting for the changing probate rate and the 
shifting shares of the top wealth holders within the probated class.)
The 30, 696, 529 observations, 1892–1992, representing the excluded 
population, were added to the probate data and assigned wealth as 









































NOMINAL PROBATED AND NON-PROBATED (INFERRED) WEALTH  
IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1892–1992
Sources: PPR Calendars, 1892–1992 and complete death registers 1892–1992.
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wealth at various cutoffs, assigning a dummy to each wealth observation 
indicating which percentile range it fell into, then summing wealth across 
these ranges, by year.
Descriptive Results
OVERALL INEQUALITY OVER TIME
Figure 4 Panel (a) reports the Gini coefficient of probated and total 
wealth by year of death and Figure 4 Panel (b) reports the proportion of 
English dead probated over the same period. There are three immediate 
facts that these two figures indicate about the evolution of the English 
wealth distribution. First, total wealth inequality declined significantly 
from a Gini of over .9 to .8, between 1892 and 1980.
Second, after the mid 1970s, inequality in probated wealth fell but 
total inequality plateaued.20 These results are robust to different measures 
of inferring the wealth of non-probated population, as I investigate in 
Online Appendix Section D. There I compare the wealth Gini coefficients 
of Figure 4 (a) with those assuming (1) the non-probated all have zero-
wealth and (2) the non-probated all have wealth £1 below the threshold. 
The trends and levels are broadly similar.
Third, and most importantly for the average English: the proportion of 
decedents that have wealth significant enough to merit probate rate has 
been flat since the end of WWII to 1992. This simple finding is quite stark. 
Despite the great equalization of wealth over the twentieth century, most 
English have no significant wealth at death. This is even more surprising 
considering the fact that the nominal threshold for probate (now £5,000) 
was only upwardly revised sporadically (see Table 1) and was the same 
from 1984 to 2018 (and is the threshold today in July 2020). A modest 
rise in the wealth of the “middle class,” the average English decedent, 
coupled with inflation, should have resulted in a rocketing probate rate 
and a far greater increase in the wealth share. Yet this is not evident.
As Figures 4 and 8 indicate, this is a story of a reshuffling of the share 
of the top .1 to 10 percent to the rest of the probated population. The 
bottom 60 percent of English have seen no increase whatsoever in their 
wealth share in the “great equalization.” Of course, inter-vivos bequests 
could obscure the true pattern of wealth holding. But if this is the case, 
we would expect the results to find a greater rise of the middle class. 
Given the “progressive” (confiscatory) nature of the top marginal rate of 
20 Caution should be exercised with the post 1980 inequality results due to the decline in the 
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(a) Gini Coefficient in Wealth
inheritance taxes after 1950, Figure 14 Panel (b), we would expect the 
rich and the very rich to have a greater proportional incentive to dispose 
of as much wealth as possible before death.
What of the reshuffling of wealth within the top 30 percent? Uniquely, 
the PPR data allow us to estimate wealth share below the top 10 percent.
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PERCENTILE WEALTH SHARES OVER TIME, DETAILED BREAKDOWN
Figure 5 reports the shares of the top percentiles of the wealth distri-
bution annually from 1892 to 1992. In contrast to Figure 8, these esti-
mates are for non-overlapping percentiles (hence the top .1-1 percent do 
not include the top .1 percent and so on). The results for the top 10 percent 
mirror earlier work by Atkinson and Harrison (1978), Atkinson, Gordon, 
and Harrison (1989), and Atkinson (2013).
The top .1 percent and top .1–1 percent, graphed in Figure 5 Panel (a) 
account for a consistently decreasing share of all wealth until about 1975. 
The top .1 percent hold 36 percent of all wealth in 1892 and the top .1–1 
percent hold 38 percent—meaning that the top 1 percent hold 74 percent 
of all wealth in England and Wales. This declines to 22 percent by 1975 
(7 and 15 percent of all wealth is held by the top .1 percent and the top 
.1–1 percent, respectively). Thereafter their shares are roughly constant 
to 1992.21
Two aspects of the decline of these very top shares are surprising. First, 
the decline is apparent well before 1940. Second, the plateaux in the decline 
of the share of the super rich coincide with the oil shocks of the 1970s and 
the end of the European “Golden Age” of post-war economic growth. The 
share of the top 5-1 percent, graphed in Figure 5 Panel (b) has held roughly 
constant over the observed century, as also noted by Atkinson, Gordon, 
and Harrison (1989, p. 319) (but does rise and decline in the series reported 
here), while the share of the top 10-5 percent has consistently risen, from 4 
percent of all wealth in 1892 to 17 percent in 1992.
Figure 6 reports the dynamics of even 10 percent bins of the wealth 
distribution. What emerges here is that the decline of the share of the top 
1 percent of wealth is entirely absorbed by the top 10-5 percent, the top 
80–90 percent and the top 70–80 percent. Despite the choppiness of the 
estimates for the lower percentiles, it is clear that for the top 50–70 percent 
there is astonishingly little growth in the wealth share. Further, the rate 
of increase of the share of wealth held by all percentiles below the top 10 
percent is negatively related to the percentile. For example, the 80–90th 
percentile increase their share from 1.5 percent in 1892 to 25 percent in 
1992, and the 70–80th percentile go from <1 percent to 12 percent in 1992.
In summary, over the century 1892–1992, the top 10 percent reduce 
their wealth share from 99 to 65 percent.22 The relative winners are the 
21 The top .1 percent share moves around a bit before 1900—it is, by definition, a small group—
there are 345 members of the top .1 percent in 1900.
22 The bottom 90 percent estimate of the wealth share at 35 percent in 1980–1992 matches 
estimates from the United States by Saez and Zucman (2016).
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Figure 5
TOP WEALTH SHARES, ENGLAND 1892–1992
Sources: PPR Calendars, 1892–1992 and complete death registers 1892–1992.
(b) The 90–95th and 95–99th Percentile
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20 percent immediately below them. Where is the growth of the “middle 
class?” Below the top 30 percent, the bottom 70 percent go from around 
.02 percent of all English wealth to around 2 percent by 1992, a ten-
fold increase, but tiny in absolute terms. These trends, while unprece-
dented and transformational, do not translate into a rise of a broad based 
“middle” class.
The 10 richest English who died in the sample period are reported 
in Table 6. As discussed in the first section, all extreme wealth values 
were also performed by a visual check. Further, all 40,074 of the top .1 
percent, 1892–1992 were checked for duplicates by eye.23 Of the top 10 
listed in Table 6, all are known to be wealthy.24 Eight of the 10 are listed 
on thepeerage.com as being connected to the British Peerage.
Figure 6
ENGLISH WEALTH HOLDING BY DECILE, 1892–1992
Sources: PPR Calendars, 1892–1992 and complete death registers 1892–1992.
23 The duplicate check was done manually by the author to understand the data, catch unexpected 
anomalies, and to have full confidence in the data-building process. Of the 41,696 top .1 percent 
1892–1992, 1,622 entries were duplicates. Duplication had two potential sources: (1) A rich 
person could be probated more than once (and have two or more entries in the PPR Calendars). 
(2) The process failed to deduplicate correctly. For the rest of the wealth distribution, problems 1 
and 2 will result in some duplication, although the probability of multiple probate is likely highly 
correlated with the size and complexity of the estate.
24 Number 1, John Reeves Ellerman was so reclusive that even the newspapers he owned could 
not find a photograph for his obituary (www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1519047/Was-this-
the-richest-and-most-secretive-British-tycoon-ever.html). Note that his original entry is one of 




















THE “SYNTHETIC” HOUSEHOLD LEVEL
The PPR Calendars report individual wealth holding at death. The house-
hold to which an individual belongs is not reported. It could be that wealth 
is held by specific individuals within households but these resources are 
available, for consumption, education etc., for the household as a whole. 
To examine this, I estimate the implied household level wealth distribution 
from the individual level PPR Calendars, for England 1892–1992.
I apply a simple transformation to the individual level data to generate 
an estimate of household level wealth holding. Let us assume that the 
population is composed of two-person households of which only one is 
ever observed in the probate process. In this world, the population of 

















Rank Name Place Nominal Real
1 Sir John Reeves Ellerman, Baronet 1933 London 25,817,786 1,257,371,575
2 Henry Overton Wills 1911 Somerset 5,214,356 433,864,083
3 James Buchanan, Baron Woolavington 1935 Cornwall 7,150,000 345,796,993
4 Wentworth Beaumont, Baron 1907 London 3,234,806 279,678,377
5 John Gretton 1899 London 2,883,640 265,401,845
6 Sir Andrew Barclay Walker 1893 Liverpool 2,876,781 260,701,343
7 Panaghi Athanarius Vagliano 1902 London 2,888,095 256,213,849
8 William Orme Foster 1899 Shropshire 2,587,681 238,162,639
9 William Louis Winans 1897 Brighton 2,522,005 233,821,183
10 Sir Edward Payson Wills, Baronet 1910 Bristol 2,633,477 219,740,419
Note: 2015 prices.
Source: PPR Calendars, 1892–1992.
25 This ignores the changing size of households over time (Holmans 2005, p. 14, table A1), but 
is chosen for simplicity. It also ignores the fact that members of a household seldom die in the 
same year; the estimates should be thought of as a crude extension of the individual level results 
for comparison in the fifth section.
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where Nt
pHH is the number of probated households in year t, and Nt
p is the 
number of probated individuals (e.g., Column 2 of Table 5). The number 











d is the number of deaths in a year. The idea is that the number of 
deaths that have zero wealth (Nt
d – 2 * Nt
p) also represent households of 
two people, on average (in this case both are not probated). The assump-
tions are strong, but this exercise is intended as an upper limit on the level 
of inequality we would observe if we interpreted the individual probate 
data, not as individual returns, but as households. Therefore the most 
equitable assumptions for these are employed.26
The resulting inequality calculations are then based on the implied 
number of households observed with wealth and those who receive an 






Each probated observation represents an implied household of two 
adults and each inferred observation (assigned missing wealth as before) 
represents a household of two adults who are not probated. The exer-
cise assumes that the population is only comprised of these two types of 
households and there are no households where both members of a couple 
make probate. It ignores the possibility that rich couples could both be 
probated. This is clearly not an accurate assumption, but is necessary 
without detailed couple level information. It should therefore be thought 
of as an upper bound on the household distribution of wealth implied 
from the individual level PPR Calendar data.
Figure 7 reports inequality at this synthetic household level. 
The proportion of households reporting wealth sufficient to merit 
probate is close to 80 percent, 1945–1992 (Figure 7 Panel (a)). So while 
wealth holding at the individual level is still under 50 percent, even in 
2010 to 2018, the implied household level consumption inequality is 
26 To give a simple example, assume there are 10 people dying, and we observe 3 probates. The 
individual probate rate is 3/10, 30 percent. A population of 10 is interpreted here as 5 households 
of 2 people (Equation (1)) . Hence there are 3 probated households (Equation (2)) and the number 
of zero-wealth households is 10
2
 − 3 = 2 (Equation (3)). The household probate rate is thus 3/5, 
60 percent. Wealth shares and Gini coefficients can be calculated over three households with 
probated wealth and two households with inferred wealth.
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Figure 7
INEQUALITY MEASURES AT THE INDIVIDUAL AND IMPLIED HOUSEHOLD LEVEL, 
1892–1992
Sources: PPR Calendars, 1892–1992 and complete death registers 1892–1992.
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(c) The top .1% and .1–1% 
(d) By Decile
Figure 7 (CoNTiNued)
INEQUALITY MEASURES AT THE INDIVIDUAL AND IMPLIED HOUSEHOLD LEVEL, 
1892–1992



































considerably lower. The vast majority of households have some wealth. 
There is a steeper decline in the wealth Gini coefficient from 1900 to 
1975 at the household level compared to the individual level (Panel (b)). 
However, both series are flat after 1975. 
The share of the top 1 percent is lower at the household level throughout 
1892–1992 (compare Figure 7 Panel (c) with Figure 5 Panel (a)), but the 
trends in the decline are the same. At the wealth decile level, the top 
10 percent of households hold the vast majority of all wealth (e.g., just 
under 50 percent in 1990, compared with about 62 percent of wealth 
held by the top 10 percent of individuals). However, the bottom wealth 
deciles report significantly more wealth at the household level than the 
individual wealth deciles (compare Figure 7 Panel (d) with Figure 6). 
However, the share of wealth held by the bottom 60 percent of house-
holds is still modest, at around 12 percent.
Of course, this synthetic household level calculation is perhaps best 
understood as a signal of the inherit difficulty in extracting true wealth 
inequality of consumption from individual inequality of capital owner-
ship, as revealed by the PPR Calendars. Both patterns are important for 
our understanding of the evolution of wealth inequality across the twen-
tieth century.
TRIANGULATING THE RESULTS
In this section, I triangulate the results of the analysis with existing 
studies. I compare the PPR Calendar data with estimates of top wealth 
shares, home-ownership trends, wealth survey distributions, aggregate 
wealth, and the wealth Gini coefficient.
The PPR wealth data analyzed in this article is measured at death. 
Typically, housing and wealth surveys concern the living. Lifecycle 
accumulation and dissaving patterns may result in peak wealth during life 
being very different to remaining wealth at death (see, e.g., Modigliani 
1986).27 Yet, people do not know when they are going to die and it typi-
cally comes as a surprise (Dor-Ziderman, Lutz, and Goldstein 2019). 
However, when comparing different measures of wealth, the timing of 
observation over the course of life must always be kept in mind. Are 
the inequality patterns described by the PPR Calendars consistent with 
what we already know about wealth and inequality in England and 
Wales?
27 On the related point that observed inequality may simply reflect the effects of people dying 
at different ages, see Atkinson (1971) for a rebuttal.
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TOP PERCENTILE SHARES
Figure 8 compares my estimates of the top .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent shares 
of the wealth distribution with recent estimates from Alvaredo, Atkinson, 
and Morelli (2018). In general, my estimates for the share of the top 10 and 
5 percent wealth shares appear to be over-estimated relative to Alvaredo, 
Atkinson, and Morelli (2018), but there is a striking correspondence for 
our estimates of the top .1 and 1 percent shares.28 Further the trends in all 
series are the same, until the 1980s. The estimates agree that inequality 
stopped rising but my estimates show a higher share of wealth for the 
upper percentiles that is even, possibly, increasing. However, post 1980, 
the PPR Calendars increasingly use “banded” wealth estimates that are 
clearly loosely applied (this is discussed further in the Online Appendix).29
28 Due to the exclusion of settled property before 1925, as reported in Table 2, the shares of the 
top 1 percent are likely underestimated before then (see, also, Alvaredo, Atkinson, and Morelli 
2018, p. 33).
29 As discussed, Alvaredo, Atkinson, and Morelli (2018) use the estate multiplier method to 
adjust decedents estate tax data to match that of the living population. My series is constructed 
without this adjustment. This adjustment does not make a serious difference to their estimates.
Figure 8
COMPARING DIFFERENT ESTIMATES OF TOP WEALTH SHARES,  
ENGLAND 1892–1992
Notes: The solid lines are estimates from Alvardeo, Atkinson, and Morelli (2018) and the dashed 
lines are PPR estimates.




















The other significant difference between the series in Figure 8 is the 
trend in the top-wealth shares, 1900–1910. The PPR Calendar estimates 
show a significant decline, then rise, over this decade while the Alvaredo, 
Atkinson, and Morelli (2018) estimates shows a stable decline. Both 
estimates start and end the decade with approximately the same value. 
There are important differences in the composition of assets that form 
the basis for each of these wealth estimates (most importantly settled 
personalty (Rubinstein 1974, p. 70)). However, a closer analysis of this 
divergence reveals that the 1901 change in the minimum value of an 
estate requiring probate (from £10 to £50) results in a significant rise 
in the value of inferred wealth for the excluded population. This rises 
abruptly from £1.84 in 1901 to £14.55 in 1902. This sudden rise in the 
average wealth of the excluded population is not real and the resulting 
changes in the wealth-share trends in the PPR Calendar series are an arti-
fact of this. Caution must therefore be exercised in interpreting the PPR 
Calendar estimate around the years where the probate minimum changed. 
In Online Appendix Section C, I examine this issue and conclude that 
the inequality trends based on the PPR Calendar data are robust to this 
concern.
Home Ownership
The most important asset for most English is the family home. However, 
housing needs vary across the life cycle. The tendency for individuals 
and couple’s to “downsize” as they enter retirement age ranges and older, 
to sell the family home and use the surplus for care needs will dilute 
wealth.30 Unfortunately, the PPR Calendar data report neither age nor a 
specific estimate of housing wealth. However, we can still ask whether 
the well-known features of the English housing market in the twentieth 
century are consistent with the inequality trends presented in this article.
Home ownership rose across the twentieth century; the proportion of 
households that was designated owner-occupied was 23 percent in 1918, 
51 percent in 1971, and was 69 percent by 2001 (a rise of 300 percent, 
Office for National Statistics (2013), with the pre 1971 numbers based on 
Holmans (1987)).31 This trend is plotted in Figure 9 Panel (a). However, 
the relevant comparison for assessing the plausibility of the PPR wealth 
30 However, Banks et al. (2012), using the British Household Panel Survey, show that this 
tendency is modest in Britain (their figure 2).
31 “A household is defined as one person living alone, or a group of people (not necessarily 
related) living at the same address who share cooking facilities and share a living room or sitting 
room or dining area” (Office for National Statistics 2013).
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(b) Real House Prices, 1845-2016
Figure 9
THE HOUSING MARKET IN ENGLAND AND WALES, TWENTIETH CENTURY
Notes: Owner-Occupied rate from the Office for National Statistics (2013), with the pre 1971 
data based on Holmans (1987). The Ownership-Rate, the proportion of adults owning housing is 
calculated as the Owner-Occupied rate divided by the average number of adults per household, 
which is reported in Holmans (2005). House prices calculated from the Bank of England (2020), 
which reports a nominal house price index 1840–2016. I applied a 2015 nominal house price of 
£290,000 (Office for National Statistics 2015b) to generate the implied nominal prices from the 
index. I then applied the CPI to give the real price series, also from the Bank of England (2020).
Source: National Statistics (2013, 2015b), Holmans (1987, 2005), and the Bank of England (2020). 
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data is the ownership rate, per adult.32 I calculated this measure as the 
owner-occupied rate (which gives the proportion of houses that are occu-
pied by an owner) divided by the number of adults per house (calculated 
from the number of adults and the number of households in census years, 
reported in Holmans (2005, p. 14, table A1)).33
I plot this measure, the proportion of adults owning a house, in Figure 
9 Panel (a). This measure shows a proportionally higher rise than the 
owner-occupied rate, rising from 8 percent in 1918 to a peak of 38 percent 
in 2001 (a rise of approximately 500 percent, and falls after). However, 
this per adult estimate is entirely consistent with the results from the 
PPR Calendar wealth data where the spread of wealth over the twentieth 
century is limited to the top 30 percent of decedents (until 1992, Figure 
6) and the proportion of English with “probatable” wealth is 40 percent 
from 1950–1992, and close to 50 percent 1996–2018 (Figure 4 Panel (b)).
Another aspect of the housing market is the rise in average house 
values over the sample period, as plotted in Figure 9 Panel (b). In 1980, 
the average price of a house in England and Wales was £95,151 (2015 
prices). By 2015, this had risen to £290,000.34 This is captured by the 
probate data in Figure 4 Panel (b), which shows a simultaneous, dramatic 
rise in the amount of wealth subject to probate at death, from £5bn to 
10bn, 1980 to 1990.
The “Right-to-Buy” scheme introduced by the 1980 Housing Act 
allowed tenants to purchase their council home (socially provided 
housing). This was associated with a rise in the proportion of owner-
occupied housing, as in Figure 9 Panel (a). Other things being equal, 
we might expect this to also be associated with greater wealth equality. 
Surprisingly, it is not associated with any drop in the wealth shares of 
the top percentiles (Figure 8), overall inequality (Figure 4 Panel (a)), or 
the proportion probated (Figure 4 Panel (b)). The trend in all of these 
measures is flat during this period. However, it may be the case that 
without “Right-to-Buy,” inequality would have been even higher during 
the 1980s and 1990s. Since 1991, the proportion of housing that is rented 
has increased from 9 to 18 percent and the owner-occupancy rate has 
fallen from 68 to 64 percent, associated here with a flat probate rate of 
less than 50 percent (Figure 4 Panel (b)).
32 This is because the PPR Calendar data is recorded at the individual level while an owner-
occupied rate is a household measure. For example, if two people live in one “owner-occupied” 
house, they each own half a house, not two houses.
33 Adults per household were 2.73 in 1921, falling to 1.8 by 2001, reflecting both the decline in 
multigenerational households and the rise in single-person households.
34 See note to Figure 9 Panel (b) for details on this calculation.
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In the subsection discussing average wealth, as shown in Figure 12, I 
compare average levels of wealth from the PPR Calendar with existing 
estimates of net financial wealth, including housing wealth. There is an 
almost exact correspondence between the two measures. In sum, the 
existing evidence from the twentieth-century housing market is consis-
tent with the wealth trends from the PPR Calendars.
Wealth Studies
In 2018, median household wealth, excluding pension wealth, is £170,900 
(Office for National Statistics 2015b, table 2.4). However, person-level 
total wealth, excluding pension wealth, is estimated at £30,000 (Office for 
National Statistics 2019, Sheet “R6 Person Level”). However, the empirical 
base for historical wealth estimates are limited.35 This subsection compares 
the PPR Calendar data to the Oxford Savings Surveys (OSS) of the 1950s 
and the Financial Research Survey (FRS) of 1991.
OXFORD SAVINGS SURVEYS
The OSS of the 1950s collected information on the income, savings, 
and net worth of respondents.36 However, despite the representative aim of 
the OSS, the response rate to the surveys was only 67 percent (Lydall and 
Tipping 1961). In addition, it was suspected that considerable underestima-
tion of wealth was reported by the richest (Atkinson and Harrison 1974, p. 
125). Lydall and Tipping (1961) used the 1954 OSS to calculate a represen-
tative estimate of the individual wealth distribution below £2,000. Above 
£2,000, they used estate duty returns. Figure 10 reports their estimate of the 
proportion of individuals within each wealth band. For the proportions of 
individuals within the wealth groups richer than £500, the estimates of this 
article and those of Lydall and Tipping (1961) closely align. Above £2,000 
the PPR Calendar consistently reports higher proportions of the popula-
tion. However, given the sampling error, we should be careful not to over-
interpret this. Below £100, it is clear that the PPR estimates assign a far 
35 As noted by Banks and coauthors: “yet there is almost no empirical evidence concerning the 
distribution of wealth at the household or individual level in the UK” (Banks, Dilnot, and Low 
1994, p. 1). “... very little is actually known about the amount of wealth held by the majority of 
UK households, or, more particularly, the distribution of total wealth amongst these households” 
(Banks and Tanner 1996, p. 38).
36 Klein, Straw, and Vandome (1956, p. 298, table II,) report the raw distribution of net worth 
within the OSS of 1953 and 1954 and I compare those household level estimates with synthetic 
PPR households in Online Appendix Table J.1. The surveys were not continued after the 1950s 
(Atkinson and Harrison 1974, p. 125).
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greater share of individuals. Considering that death imposes a fixed cost 
(e.g., funeral and legal costs), the estimates are consistent with each other. 
This article estimates that in 1950s England, 71 percent of individuals have 
less than £500, Lydall and Tipping (1961) estimate for Great Britain 75 
percent of individuals have less than £500. Considering that Scotland and 
Wales are poorer than England, these estimates are broadly in line.37
THE FAMILY EXPENDITURE SURVEY AND THE FINANCIAL RESEARCH SURVEY
The FES, which was collected annually from 1961–2001, is the major 
source for the analysis of household income and expenditure for the 





























































Lydall and Tipping 1961
PPR
Figure 10
COMPARISON OF NET CAPITAL WITH LYDALL AND TIPPING 1961,  
BY WEALTH BAND, 1950s
Notes: The PPR covers England and the Lydall and Tipping (1961) estimates cover Great Britain. 
Both estimates exclude pension wealth.
Sources: PPR Calendars and Lydall and Tipping (1961, p. 89). 
37 See Clark and Cummins (2018) for a regional analysis of the PPR data.
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particular the quality of the investment income data, have been severely 
criticized (see Atkinson and Micklewright (1983) for a detailed discus-
sion).38 Further, information on wealth was not systematically collected 
over the majority of the sample period.39
Due to the problems of using the FES to measure wealth, I instead 
compare the PPR Calendar data to the more comprehensive FRS of 
1991 and 1992 (Banks, Dilnot, and Low 1994). (Figure J.2 in the Online 
Appendix summarizes the existing surveys of wealth for the end of the 
sample period, the late 1980s-early 1990s.)
Banks, Dilnot, and Low (1994) use the FRS and augment it with 
housing wealth from the British Household Panel Study to estimate 
median total (non-pension wealth by wealth decile for 1991–2 (p. 21) 
at the household level. Figure 11 compares the median value of wealth 
for the PPR data, 1991–2, by wealth decile, for households and indi-
viduals with that reported by Banks, Dilnot, and Low (1994, p. 21, figure 
3.6). The transformation of the individual level PPR data to a synthetic 
household, as described in the fourth section, results in a more egalitarian 
wealth structure and a greater level of median wealth at every decile. 
(The top 10 percent of household are richer than the top 10 percent of 
individuals.)
In comparison with the household level PPR estimates, the FRS esti-
mates are considerably lower, at every decile. However, this may be due 
to the deficiency of the FRS: As Banks, Dilnot, and Low (1994) note “the 
FRS identifies only about 40% of aggregate financial wealth” (p. 10). It 
is clear that the PPR data detect considerably more wealth than the FRS.40
Supporting this assessment, that the FRS seriously underestimates 
true wealth is Disney, Johnson, and Stears (1998). Using data from the 
Retirement Surveys of 1988 and 1994, they report a non-zero median 
wealth for English retirees of £177,700. This translates to £283,746 
in 2015 prices. This compares with an average for the PPR synthetic 
38 Typically, scholars used the income data to infer wealth. “Financial wealth is inferred by 
grossing-up reported investment income according to prevailing interest rates” (Hancock 1998). 
Banks and Johnson (1998b, p. 2) report that investment income in the FES is about 40–60 percent 
of the national accounts figure. The Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth 
in 1975 assessed that “estimates from the survey are less accurate than the Inland Revenue data 
because of the smaller sample size and because of the problems of non-response” (Atkinson and 
Micklewright 1983, p. 33). Further, Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) who use the FES to study 
the effects of pension reforms on savings behavior had to drop nearly 50 percent of the sample 
and even then use a measure of wealth that “excludes capital gains on real estate and financial 
assets” (p. 1505). 
39 For example, property values were collected only after 1992 (Hancock 1998).
40 Banks and Tanner (1996) compares the FRS data with asset holding information from the 
Family Expenditure Study (FES). It is clear from their figure 1 (p. 46) that the FRS considerably 
underestimates wealth, even at lower wealth levels.
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households of £225,091 in 1992. In summary, assessing the quality of the 
PPR Calendar wealth data is complicated by the fact that there are few 
alternative and contemporary sources of wealth holding with accurate 
information. How does the PPR Calendar wealth compare with aggregate 
levels of wealth, calculated from other sources?
Average Wealth
Blake and Orszag (1999) use a wide variety of sources, including 
Inland Revenue data, building society deposits, life and annuity funds, 
the UK National Income accounts, and the Annual Abstract of Statistics 
(ONS), to calculate annual aggregate estimates of wealth holding in 
the United Kingdom, 1948–1994. I have taken their estimates for non-
pension wealth (namely net financial wealth, housing wealth, and 
consumer durable assets) and calculated a per-adult measure of average 
wealth. Figure 12 reports this average and compares it with the average 
for the PPR wealth data used in this article.
There are important differences between the series; Blake and Orszag 
(1999) calculate a value for the United Kingdom, the PPR data is for 

















Financial Research Survey, 1991/1992
PPR Calendars, 1991/1992, Household
PPR Calendars, 1991/1992, Individual
Figure 11
COMPARISON OF MEDIAN REAL WEALTH, BY WEALTH DECILE,  
PPR CALENDARS AND FINANCIAL RESEARCH SURVEY
Sources: PPR Calendars, 1892–1992 and complete death registers 1892–1992, and Banks et al. 
(1994).
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in Figure 12 is per living adult. The PPR wealth data is measured at 
death. Nevertheless there is a striking concordance between these series. 
This applies both to levels and trend; the elasticity of the measures to 
each other is .894.
Thus the PPR Calendar data matches well with what we know about 
aggregate level wealth in the economy.
Gini Coefficients in Wealth
Figure 13 compares the Gini coefficient calculated from the PPR 
wealth data, which refer to England, with existing estimates of the wealth 
Gini for the United Kingdom, 1966–2017. The Gini is calculated at both 
individual and synthetic household level.
The individual level PPR Calendar Gini coefficient lies midway 
between the existing individual level Gini wealth estimates of Good 
(1991) and HMRC (2005a). Note that the PPR estimate corresponds 
exactly to the Inland Revenue (IR) estimates before 1980. After 1980, 
they diverge, with the IR series declining and the PPR individual series 
plateauing. HMRC (2005a) and Good (1991) use the estate multiplier 
method, as do Atkinson and Harrison (1978), Alvaredo, Atkinson, and 



















Blake and Orszag 1999
PPR
Figure 12
COMPARING AVERAGE WEALTH WITH BLAKE AND ORSZAG (1999)
Sources: PPR wealth data, Blake and Orszag (1999, table 12) (sum of columns “net financial 
wealth,” “housing wealth,” and “consumer durable assets”). These aggregate sums were converted 
to a per adult measure using the population data from the Office for National Statistics (2018a).
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that these estimates are based on a sample of estates paying estate duty 
and inheritance tax.41
The household level estimates of the wealth Gini coefficient unfortu-
nately do not overlap in time but the levels are consistent and not wildly 
different.
There are reasons to believe that the PPR data is superior to alter-
natives for estimating Gini coefficients due to the large, non-sampled 
population level estate of wealth employed. Where wealth is distributed 
non-normally, this coverage matters a lot and may explain some of the 






















COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT ESTIMATES OF THE GINI COEFFICIENT IN WEALTH, 
1970–2017
Sources: PPR Calendars, IR: Inland Revenue 1987, 1996 as reported by Davies and Shorrocks 
(2000, table 2) (all United Kingdom), Good (1991) (estate-duty based estimates, United Kingdom, 
1976–1986), HMRC (2005, table 13.5) (estate-duty based estimates, United Kingdom, 1976–
2005), Office for National Statistics (2018b) (United Kingdom, 2006–2016; Wealth and Assets 
Survey).
41 “The inheritance tax sample of estates reported to Inland Revenue (IR) Capital Taxes 
(formerly known as the Capital Taxes Office) includes all the estates of younger people and all 
the largest estates. In the largest estates, there is a wide variation in size and composition. The 
statistical errors of the wealth estimates for these strata are therefore large. Newer sources of 
wealth, for example the wealth of winners of the national lottery, windfall gains associated with 
privatization, demutualisations and company re-organisations, will not be accurately reflected in 
the inheritance tax data underlying the estimates” (HMRC 2012, p. 1). (Note that the very high 
Good estimates were refined into the lower HMRC estimates as the methodology developed, see 
HMRC (2012, p. 1).) I include the Good estimates to indicate the range that simple adjustments 
make to the methodology.
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triangulating the PPR wealth data however, where available, the PPR 
Gini estimates are broadly consistent with those calculated by other 
studies.
DISCUSSION
This article has documented the rise of the English wealth “middle class” 
from 1892 to 1992 (Cummins 2021). From the individual PPR Calendar 
data, English wealth holding is surprisingly limited and has not changed 
much since 1945. The bottom 60 percent of English hold no significant 
wealth. However, from a synthetic household perspective, this probate 
rate is consistent with over 80 percent of households having some wealth, 
if we assume one wealth holder being probated per married couple. At this 
level, probate was already covering the vast majority of English house-
holds. It did not rise because it was already high, over 75 percent, by 1945. 
Yet, even with this, likely over-estimated, wealth-holding proportion, the 
bottom 60 percent of households hold only about 12 percent of all wealth.
The PPR Calendar wealth data do not record pension wealth; it could 
be that the vast majority of “middle class” wealth is held as such. As life 
expectancy has risen consistently over the twentieth century, there has 
been more retirement life to fund.42 However, pension wealth and entitle-
ments that end with death, do not represent controllable financial assets 
but deferred consumption.
The PPR Calendar data reflect the individual details of the distribution 
of controllable financial capital at death. This distribution is important 
for understanding the power dynamics in a capitalist democracy. Policies 
towards taxation and redistribution will conceivably be influenced by its 
distribution. Power dynamics within households, the economic status and 
position of women and children, will also be influenced by the pattern of 
wealth ownership. This analysis shows that this distribution is surpris-
ingly skewed towards the top 30 percent of individuals. What forces 
explain the emergence of this pattern?
Piketty (2014) proposes a new general law of capitalism: when the 
growth rate of the economy is greater than the rate of return on capital 
in the economy (r), the concentration of wealth is diluted. However, the 
role of taxation, which is not an automatic rule but a set of laws that are 
also related to political forces was also crucial. Figure 14 sketches the 
42 Another possible effect here are the reforms to the U.K. pension scheme, for example, the 
State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) in 1978, an additional earnings related pension 
that augmented the basic state pension. Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) find a substitution 
between the introduction of this scheme and household savings
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Figure 14
r, g, AND taxes IN THE “GREAT EQUALIZATION” OF ENGLISH WEALTH
Sources: Panel (a): Piketty (2014, figure 6.3; Data on the rate of return to capital available from 
http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capital21c2) and GDP per capita from the Maddison Project (http://
www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm). Both rates are “Real” (see Piketty, pp. 




















(b) Inheritance Taxes in England
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path of these forces over the twentieth century. The timing of the simple 
r − g model of wealth dilution does not match well the timing of the 
secular decline of the top wealth shares. For example, Figures 5 Panel 
(a) and 7 Panel (a) report a consistent decline of the shares of the top 1 
percent and the top .01 percent from about 1914 to 1975. Moreover, r – g 
is positive for the entire twentieth century, as plotted in Figure 14 Panel 
(a). The effects of high inheritance taxes also have timing issues: when 
the decline of the top 1 percent begins around 1913, inheritance taxes are 
a small fraction of what they rise to by 1950.Yet, there is no accelera-
tion on the rate of decline of the top 1 percent—it is constant throughout 
(again, see Figures 5 Panel (a) and 7 Panel (a)). However, once taxation 
is set at a flat 40 percent in the 1980s, as plotted in Figure 14 Panel (b), 
the share of the top 1 percent stops declining. 
It is clear that the decline of the top 1 percent drives the entire distri-
bution of twentieth-century English wealth. One possibility is that WWI 
destroyed significant amounts of elite capital and a generation of elite 
inheritors were wiped out by the high mortality rate of the officer class 
during WWI (Winter 1977). The concentrated wealth that would have 
been inherited had these men survived could then have been dissipated 
across an extended family. Another possibility is that elite dynasties are 
simply hiding their wealth, both legally and illegally. These avenues are 
explored in depth in a complementary paper (Cummins 2019).
What about the behavior of the “middle-classes” themselves? The 
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw a significant expansion of 
the role of human capital in the economy. It is possible that we do not 
see a greater accumulation of “middle class” wealth because all surplus 
income is invested both in pensions and in investment in the human 
capital of offspring. There were multiple acts of legislation from the 
Forster Education Act of 1870 to the Education Act of 1944 (only fully 
implemented in 1972) that raised the age of compulsory school atten-
dance. However, the middle classes were already educating their children 
at high rates (these acts primarily affected the poor). In 1961, 5 percent of 
those age 18–19 attended university or another higher education institu-
tion. In 1995, this was 35 percent (the Dearing Report, officially known 
as the UK National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, 1997).43
There is no doubt that there was a large increase in the fixed cost of 
raising a middle class child over the twentieth century. According to 
the economic theory of fertility, this cost is cited as one of the major 
43 It must be noted here that while university was “free” until 1998 and there were maintenance 
grants for poorer students, the expansion of tertiary educational qualifications was dominated by 
those from middle- and high-income families (Blanden and Machin 2013).
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reasons why family sizes are smaller today than a century ago (Becker 
1991).
There are a number of possible, complementary explanations for the 
path of twentieth-century wealth inequalities in England. However, 
if we compare England with other countries we see that precisely the 
same secular decline occurs everywhere we have estimates (see Piketty 
(2014)). So whatever theory explains the decline of wealth inequality 
in England must also explain the international pattern too. As yet, this 
remains a mystery.
Families face constant trade offs. There are other things in life than the 
accumulation of capital. Some in society will have a preference for work. 
Others for non-monetary activities. Once immediate consumption needs 
are met, individuals can choose other non-market activities that benefit 
mental health, the quality and depth of their social ties and community, 
or their spiritual and religious life. Wealth is but one aspect that people 
value, and we can expect that individuals will trade off potential wealth 
for time doing activities that promote non-financial well-being. The 
current wealth distribution could also simply reflect individual innate 
differences in the preference for holding or spending capital.
CONCLUSION
Using novel population-scale data, this article has freshly character-
ized the English wealth distribution between 1892 and 1992; a period that 
captures the “Great Equalization” of wealth. When it comes to the owner-
ship of capital, I find that r – g dynamics failed to create a broadly based 
wealth “middle” class England. Even in the post war years, the period of 
the massive drop in the wealth share of the top 1 percent from 73 to 20 
percent, two-thirds of English decedents lived, worked, then died with 
nothing to their name.44
This article is an opening salvo for a research agenda examining the 
determinants of the English wealth distribution over the past century 
and more. Future research that can fully exploit the rich individual level 
detail of the PPR entries has great promise. The data contain compelling 
surname information, for example, as well as exact street addresses of 
decedents. A population analysis, for example, of the controversial social 
mobility claims of Clark and Cummins (2015a) could be attempted. 
Why did the share of the top point 1 percent decline so dramatically? 
44 Separate evidence supporting this comes from Karagiannaki (2015), who estimates from 
contemporary survey data that the median English inherit £0 during their lifetime (p. 198, table 
4). (The 43 percent of inheritors receive a median sum of £9,400.)
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Every member of the top .1 percent is listed in the PPR data. Their family 
history, life choices, and demography can now be detailed and tracked. 
Theoretically, linking the wealth distribution to theories of social mobility 
that are consistent with the empirical facts, given by the PPR data, is 
another direction.
The methodology applied here to constructing a new dataset can be 
applied to any set of images of historical records that contain consistent 
formatting. There are millions of these images on website servers all over 
the world. As OCR software continues to become more accurate, there is 
now remarkable potential for new, big data analysis in economic history.
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